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Life and Civil Death in the Ocean 
State: Resurrecting Life-Prisoners’ 
Right to Access Courts in Rhode 
Island 
James Michael Kovach* 
“The flames sawed in the wind and the embers paled and 
deepened and paled and deepened like the bloodbeat of 
some living thing eviscerate upon the ground before them 
and they watched the fire which does contain within it 
something of men themselves inasmuch as they are less 
without it and are divided from their origins and are 
exiles.” –Cormac McCarthy1 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of civil death, or “the state of a person who, though 
possessing natural life, has lost all his civil rights, and as to them, 
is considered as dead,” is anything but new, and its practice is far 
from unique to Rhode Island.2  In fact, punishing a criminal by 
stripping him of his citizenship, divorcing him of all his rights, and 
thus regarding him as dead has been practiced since at least the 
Romans.3  In Roman law, civil death was typically reserved for 
 
 *  Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 
2020. I want to thank everyone who helped me write this Comment.  Professor 
Hassel, thank you for your time and expertise.  To my parents, Jim and Jill 
Kovach, who taught me all that I know, thank you for everything. 
 1. CORMAC MCCARTHY, BLOOD MERIDIAN OR THE EVENING REDNESS IN THE 
WEST 255 (1985). 
 2. WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC 
DICTIONARY OF LAW 257 (1901). 
 3. CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 40 
(1917). 
2019] LIFE-PRISONERS 401 
punishment of serious crimes, as an accoutrement to being 
“condemned to exile . . . sentenced to be deported to an island, or . . 
. condemned to the mines.”4  In the United States, this “vestige of 
medieval jurisprudence” has historically been embodied in state 
statutes that eliminate most or all of a convicted felon’s civil rights 
upon receiving a sentence of life in prison.5  Civil death in the 
United States has declined since the mid-twentieth century, but 
Rhode Island has yet to repeal its civil death statute.6 
In Rhode Island, the civil death statute, titled “Life Prisoners 
Deemed Civilly Dead,” requires that “every person imprisoned . . . 
for life shall, with respect to . . . all civil rights and relations of any 
nature whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or 
her natural death had taken place at the time of conviction.”7  To 
the extent that life-prisoners in Rhode Island are capable of being 
released from prison on parole, the civil death statute makes no 
allowance for such parolees to regain civil life and repossess their 
rights.8  The real affects of Rhode Island’s civil death statute were 
recently on display in Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions.9  In 
 
 4. Id. at 40.  A convicted Roman criminal, not condemned to civil death, 
could nevertheless expect to suffer an impairment to his so-called “civic honor” 
or reputation so severe as to suffer what was known as “infamia,” or infamy.  
Id. at 41.  An infame was “excluded from public offices and the right to vote . . . 
[and] mak[e] a will,” and existed in a condition that is remarkably similar to 
the “Anglo-American deprivation of certain civil and political rights,” which 
still continues to this day.  Id. at 41.  
 5. Ronald Eisenman, Civil Death in New York, 14 INTRAMURAL L. REV. 
N.Y.U. 170, 170 (1958–1959).  Civil death statutes typically required a civilly 
dead person to surrender his “property rights, contract rights, the capacity to 
sue or to be sued, the citizenship status, insurance [rights], the right to make 
a will” and the right to vote.  Id. 
 6. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the 
Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012). 
 7. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956).  The civil death statute provides, in 
full:  
Every person imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions for life 
shall, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of matrimony 
and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever, be 
deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death had 
taken place at the time of conviction.  However, the bond of matrimony 
shall not be dissolved, nor shall the rights to property or other rights 
of the husband or wife of the imprisoned person be terminated or 
impaired, except on the entry of a lawfully obtained decree for divorce. 
Id. 
 8. See 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 13-6-1, 13-8-13. 
 9. Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137 (R.I. 2018). 
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this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that a 
plaintiff’s negligence claim was properly dismissed because, as a 
result of his previous life sentence, he was deemed civilly dead and 
thus prohibited from asserting any civil actions.10  The urgency of 
Gallop is amplified by its timing.  Only two weeks before the Court 
heard arguments in Gallop, the Rhode Island Legislature 
introduced a bill, which, if enacted, would have completely repealed 
the civil death statute.11 
The civil death statute openly and egregiously violates the 
Access to Courts Clause (“AC Clause”) of the Rhode Island 
Constitution, which entitles Rhode Islanders to pursue remedies in 
state courts.12  The statute further offends the United States 
Constitution as an impermissible bar of life-prisoners’ right to 
access courts, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.13  For the reasons 
expounded in this Comment, the Rhode Island Legislature should 
repeal the civil death statute outright.  Otherwise, Rhode Island 
courts must invalidate the civil death statute as unconstitutional 
and irredeemably against public policy. 
Part I of this Comment examines the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court’s application of the civil death statute in Gallop.14  This 
section will illuminate the statute’s effect on Rhode Island life-
prisoners’ ability to bring claims in court and, accordingly, call 
attention to the court’s improvident holding.  Part II surveys the 
states that have overturned civil death statutes on the grounds that 
they violated the AC Clause of their respective state constitutions, 
which contain language similar to that of Rhode Island’s AC 
 
 10. Id. at 1143.   
 11. See S.B. 2269, 145th Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018).  The bill to 
repeal the civil death statute was recommended for further study by the Rhode 
Island Senate Committee on the Judiciary on February 13, 2018, but 
subsequently was not passed into law. 
 12. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5.  The AC Clause provides, in full: 
Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by 
having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be 
received in one’s person, property, or character.  Every person ought 
to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase, completely 
and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the 
laws. 
Id. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 14. See Gallop, 182 A.3d. at 1141–45. 
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Clause.15  This survey highlights the analyses used by those states 
in scrutinizing the constitutionality of their own civil death statutes 
and lays the foundation for Rhode Island courts to follow.  Part III 
of this Comment analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s 
approach to prisoner access-to-courts challenges under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
underscores that Rhode Island’s civil death statute is not rationally 
related to the predictable and dubious          state interests often 
advanced in justification of restricting life-prisoners’ access to 
courts.16  Concluding, Part IV challenges the Rhode Island 
Legislature to return civil life to Rhode Island’s life-prisoners, 
repeal the civil death statute outright, and restore life-prisoners’ 
right to access courts.  Otherwise, this challenge falls heavily on 
Rhode Island courts to enforce both the state and United States 
Constitutions, and thus invalidate the civil death statute as 
unconstitutional and against public policy. 
I. THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT REACHED AN IMPROVIDENT AND 
UNSUSTAINABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL DEATH STATUTE IN 
GALLOP V. ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
From the outset, the Rhode Island Supreme Court appeared to 
have its hands tied in Gallop.  The court noted that by the year 
1939, only eighteen states still enforced civil death, and today, New 
York and the Virgin Islands are the only other jurisdictions that 
continue to impose civil death on life-prisoners.17  Despite the 
national trend whereby civil death statues and the associated loss 
of civil rights for convicted prisoners “have almost all but vanished,” 
the court nonetheless lamented that “[r]epeal is the province of the 
Legislature.”18 
Prior to Gallop, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had 
previously held that, although the Legislature may place 
reasonable limits on the guarantees of the AC Clause, “[t]he total 
denial of access to the courts” would “render this constitutional 
 
 15. See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Chesapeake Utils. 
Corp. v. Hopkins, 340 A.2d 154 (Del. 1975); Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306 
(Okla. 1971); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 16. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 
(1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 17. Gallop, 182 A.3d at 1141. 
 18. Id. 
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protection worthless.”19  Nevertheless, the Gallop court declared 
that because the civil death statute “unambiguously mandate[s] 
that persons serving a life sentence” are civilly dead and thus 
“prohibited from asserting civil actions,” those individuals are 
entirely without recourse.20  Accordingly, the court affirmed that 
Gallop’s negligence claim was “prudently and accurately dismissed” 
because he is serving a life sentence.21  It would have been an error 
and an “excess of jurisdiction,” the court reasoned, for a life-
prisoner’s claims to be considered by a trial court when the state 
has pronounced him civilly dead.22  The court, however, did not stop 
there. 
Just before the trial court dismissed the case, the plaintiff in 
Gallop “moved for leave to file a second amended complaint” in an 
attempt to raise constitutional claims.23  The trial judge, however, 
dismissed Gallop’s negligence claims without addressing or ruling 
on his motion to amend.24  On appeal, the Gallop court explained 
that it did not have the power to review a trial court’s ruling on a 
motion “for abuse of discretion if the trial justice ha[d] not exercised 
that discretion.”25  Confusingly, however, the court concluded that 
the plaintiff, who the court had just affirmed to be unambiguously 
without the capacity to bring a negligence action in the first 
instance, somehow remained “entitled, at the very least, to a 
reasoned decision on his motion to file an amended complaint.”26  
With no further explanation of how a civilly dead person can be 
prohibited from bringing all claims in court, yet be entitled to a 
ruling on a motion to amend the very claim he is prohibited from 
bringing, one can see that the state of civil death in Rhode Island is 
left with more access-to-courts problems after Gallop than before 
the ruling.27 
 
 19. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984).  “The 
total denial of access to the courts for adjudication of a claim even before it 
arises, however, most certainly ‘flies in the face of the constitutional command 
found in art. 1, § 5,’ . . . and to hold otherwise would be to render this 
constitutional protection worthless.”  Id. (quoting Lemoine v. Martineau, 342 
A.2d 616, 621 (R.I. 1975)). 
 20. Gallop, 182 A.3d at 1143. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1143–44.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1145. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
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II. RHODE ISLAND’S CIVIL DEATH STATUTE IS PATENTLY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE ACCESS TO COURTS CLAUSE 
Article I, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution provides 
that “[e]very person within this state ought to find a certain 
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or 
wrongs . . .” and should “obtain right and justice freely . . . 
completely and without denial.”28  By the plain language of this 
constitutional mandate, a layperson could easily articulate the 
irreconcilable contradiction created by application of the civil death 
statute.  Rhode Island is not the first state to find itself home to this 
dilemma, as at least three other states with constitutional 
provisions closely mirroring the language of Rhode Island’s AC 
Clause have solved the issue in their courts.29  This section will use 
the jurisprudence of Florida and Oklahoma courts as guideposts to 
lay the foundation for Rhode Island to invalidate the civil death 
statue as a violation of the state’s AC Clause. 
A. Florida Jurisprudence Requires Strict Scrutiny of Access-to-
Courts Barriers 
 Florida has confronted the constitutionality of civil death, and 
other bars imposed on prisoner litigation, in light of its own 
constitutional guarantee of access to courts.  The AC Clause of 
Florida’s Constitution reads: “The courts shall be open to every 
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered 
without sale, denial or delay.”30  In Lloyd v. Farkash, the First 
District Court of Appeal of Florida scrutinized the constitutionality 
of Florida’s civil death statute “insofar as it purport[ed] to deprive 
convicted felons of their right to bring civil actions.”31  Specifically, 
the Florida civil death statute provided that “upon conviction for 
felony, the civil rights of the person convicted shall be 
suspended . . . .”32 
1. Florida’s Civil Death Statute Impermissibly Abolished 
Prisoners’ Right to Access Courts and Provided No Reasonable 
 
 28. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 29. See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Chesapeake Utils. 
Corp. v. Hopkins, 340 A.2d 154 (Del. 1975); Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306 
(Okla. 1971); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 30. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
 31. 476 So. 2d at 308. 
 32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.292 (West 1997). 
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Alternative in the Absence of an Overpowering Public Necessity 
In Lloyd, the court explained that “courts have an even greater 
duty to protect” rights that are “made express by the constitution,” 
such as the rights guaranteed by an AC Clause, than rights 
extended only by implication.33  As such, the court scrutinized the 
civil death statute using the analysis set forth by the Florida 
Supreme Court in Kluger v. White, to be employed in cases involving 
a bar of the right to access courts.34  Florida’s Kluger test requires 
a three-pronged analysis whereby “the Legislature may only 
abolish [the right to gain access to courts] if it has provided a 
reasonable alternative, it has shown an overpowering public 
necessity for the abolishment of the right, and there is no 
alternative method of remedying” the public necessity.35  Crucially, 
“there is no relevant difference between the . . . test set forth in 
Kluger” and the analysis traditionally undertaken in strict scrutiny 
review.36 
In Lloyd, the court applied the Kluger strict scrutiny analysis 
to Florida’s civil death statute to determine whether the statute 
violated the AC Clause of the Florida Constitution.37  The Lloyd 
court determined that Florida’s civil death statute violated the AC 
Clause because it stripped convicted felons of all civil rights, and 
such a broad prohibition plainly “deprive[d] convicted felons of their 
right to bring civil actions in state courts . . .” without providing any 
alternative.38 
The court in Lloyd was willing to entertain the argument that 
“some legitimate purposes may be served by denying inmates 
access to the courts,” such as preventing frivolous prisoner 
litigation and avoiding “administrative inconvenience[s].”39  
Nevertheless, the court held that such interests were “insufficient 
to override the constitutional right of access to courts.”40  
Accordingly, the court unequivocally declared that it does “not 
believe that an overpowering public necessity for the suspension” of 
 
 33. Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307. 
 34. Id. at 308 (citing Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)). 
 35. Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001). 
 36. Id. at 528. 
 37. Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 308. 
 38. Id. 
 39.  Id. at 307. 
 40.  Id. 
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convicted felons’ right to access state courts “can be shown.”41  The 
distinction between the Lloyd court’s use of the words “can be 
shown,” rather than “has been shown,” is crucial.42  The 
significance of such a distinction is the Lloyd court’s belief that no 
overpowering public necessity could justify upholding a similar 
restriction on life-prisoners’ right to access courts in a future case.43  
The court thus found it unnecessary to analyze the third Kluger 
prong and ended its inquiry by concluding that Florida’s civil death 
statute did in fact violate Florida’s AC Clause.44 
2. A Public Interest in Preventing Frivolous Litigation Does Not 
Justify a Complete Bar of Prisoners’ Right to Access Courts 
Although the Lloyd court declined to address whether there 
were alternative methods for addressing some overpowering public 
interest, the Florida Supreme Court has provided some guidance 
with respect to the third prong of the analysis.45  In Mitchell v. 
Moore, the Florida Supreme Court applied the Kluger strict 
scrutiny analysis to Florida’s “Prisoner Indigency Statute” (PIS).46  
Because the PIS effectively barred life-prisoners from asserting all 
civil actions, the law was analytically equivalent to the bar imposed 
by a civil death statute.47  The court found that the restriction 
created “procedural pitfalls so difficult and time-consuming” as to 
“become a door to the Court that some inmates simply cannot 
open.”48 
Having concluded that the PIS infringed prisoners’ “right to 
seek redress for any type of injury or complaint of any kind in any 
civil case that requires a filing fee,” the court looked to whether 
there was an overpowering public necessity for such an imposition 
on prisoners’ express right to access courts under Florida’s AC 
Clause.49  In doing so, the court noted that preventing “frivolous or 
malicious civil actions” was the only public necessity identified by 
 
 41.  Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 528 (Fla. 2001). 
 46.  Id. at 525; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.085 (West 2014). 
 47.  See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 525. 
 48.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 527. 
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the Florida Legislature in enacting the PIS.50 
Without determining whether preventing frivolous litigation is 
an overpowering public necessity, the court found that the PIS was 
not narrowly tailored to such an interest.51  Specifically, the 
statute’s “copy requirement restrict[ed] and impede[d] the filing of 
many more types of inmate petitions than the types of inmate 
petitions which were identified . . . .”52  Therefore, the court held 
that even if preventing frivolous litigation was an overpowering 
public necessity, alternative and more narrowly tailored remedies 
for such a public interest plainly exist.53  As such, the court 
concluded that the PIS could not pass the Kluger strict scrutiny 
analysis.54 
B. Oklahoma Adamantly Denounced Civil Death as 
Unconscionable Legal Fiction Which Necessarily Creates 
Absurd Results 
Oklahoma has similarly faced the task of scrutinizing the 
constitutionality of civil death in light of its own constitutional 
guarantee of access to the courts.55  Oklahoma’s AC Clause is 
nearly identical to Rhode Island’s, and provides that “[t]he courts 
of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and 
certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to 
person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be 
administrated without sale, denial, delay or prejudice.”56  In Davis 
v. Pullium, the Oklahoma Supreme Court sought to determine 
whether a state negligence action was properly dismissed by 
operation of Oklahoma’s civil death statute.57  The statute provided 
that “a person sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for 
life, is thereby deemed civilly dead.”58 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Davis held that the civil 
death statute violated Oklahoma’s AC Clause, and saw an 
opportunity to highlight the absurdity of civil death.59  There, the 
 
 50. Id. at 528. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1971). 
 56. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
 57. Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308. 
 58. Id. at 1307.  
 59. See id. at 1308. 
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court actively engaged in the legal fiction contained in civil death 
statutes and zealously defended life-prisoners’ right to access 
courts.60  The court first noted the irony in that, despite having 
been pronounced civilly dead by the state, “[Davis] was allowed his 
mortal existence” by personally appearing at trial, and 
“nevertheless remain[ed] a person and a citizen.”61  The court 
passionately declared that, even though “a convicted felon may be 
disenfranchised [and] denied . . . the full fruits of citizenship, he 
nevertheless cannot be regarded as human waste.”62  The court 
thus established that, as a matter of public policy, deeming life-
prisoners civilly dead is less than humane and not in accord with a 
basic understanding of reality.63 
The court further reasoned that Oklahoma’s civil death statute 
“could produce preposterous arguments and conclusions,” and 
provided two examples.64  First, the court proposed that a person 
on trial for murder could no more be convicted of killing a civilly 
dead person than be sued in tort by the same, under the full effect 
of the civil death statute.65  Second, the court explained that a 
civilly dead person could refuse to pay his taxes, “on the theory that 
only the living are required to pay.”66  The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court made clear that the only way to avoid these preposterous 
situations is by selective and arbitrary application of a law, which, 
by its own language, makes no such attempt to enumerate or 
distinguish hypothetical situations from those warranting its 
application.67 
The court concluded that civil death statues are a significant 
“infringement upon the spirit of our system of government,” and 
“are not of harmony with the spirit of our fundamental laws.”68  In 
doing so, the court made clear that this “constitutional mandate 
ha[d] made [its] course sure and certain” and declared that “actions 
affecting [a civilly dead person’s] existence, safety and personal 
liberties are natural rights which are fully and perpetually 
 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id.; see also 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956). 
 68. Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308 (quoting Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 P.2d 
948, 948 (Okla. 1913)). 
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protected.”69  The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Davis thus 
demonstrated an alternate approach to invalidating a civil death 
statue insofar as it purports to negate the guarantees of an AC 
Clause like Rhode Island’s.70 
C.  Challenging Rhode Island’s Civil Death Statute Under the 
Access to Courts Clause 
The AC Clause of Rhode Island’s Constitution guarantees 
access to courts for all people in Rhode Island.71  Like the Lloyd 
court’s duty to protect express rights to an even greater extent than 
implied rights, “[a] basic premise of constitutional interpretation [in 
Rhode Island] is that every clause must be given its due force, 
meaning, and effect,” and, “to hold otherwise would be to render 
[express] constitutional protection worthless.”72  The fulfillment of 
this duty requires Rhode Island courts to strictly scrutinize 
attempts by the state legislature to strip its inhabitants of rights 
guaranteed to them by the Rhode Island Constitution.73  As such, 
Rhode Island courts should only uphold obstructions to express 
constitutional rights, like the access-to-courts bar imposed by the 
civil death statute, when an overpowering public necessity exists to 
which there is no alternative remedy but to abolish the right.74  In 
other words, the civil death statute should be analyzed with strict 
scrutiny when challenged on AC Clause grounds. 
1. Strict Scrutiny of Rhode Island’s Civil Death Statute 
The plain language of Rhode Island’s civil death statute 
imposes a complete bar on life-prisoners’ right to access courts, and 
likewise provides no alternative to that right.75  As such, Rhode 
Island’s civil death statute is “a door to the [c]ourt” that cannot be 
opened, and the Gallop court made that clear by stating that “the 
Legislature has . . . mandated that persons serving a life sentence 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id.  
 71. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 72. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1985); Lloyd 
v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 73. See Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307.  
 74. See id. at 307–08. 
 75. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956).  “Every person imprisoned . . . for 
life shall, with respect to . . . all civil rights and relations of any nature 
whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death 
had taken place . . . .”  Id. 
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are prohibited from asserting civil actions . . . [and] thus he is 
without recourse.”76  Such a mandate, however, is invalid under 
Rhode Island’s AC Clause, unless it is the only available “method of 
remedying” an overpowering public interest, which justifies such a 
bar on prisoners’ right to access courts.77 
In nearly all civil death-related access-to-courts cases, the only 
public interest consistently advanced is the interest in preventing 
frivolous litigation.78  The Lloyd court, however, concluded that 
such an interest is “insufficient to” justify a complete bar of the 
right to access courts, holding that no “overpowering public 
necessity for [such a bar] can be shown.”79  Similarly, the Mitchell 
court stopped short of concluding that the interest in preventing 
frivolous litigation is an overpowering public necessity.80  Rhode 
Island courts must agree that preventing frivolous prisoner 
litigation is insufficient to justify the complete prohibition of their 
right to access courts.81  To find otherwise would be to perpetrate 
the ancient and punitively conservative myth that life-prisoners 
cease to be counted as members of society upon conviction, which 
empowers the farcical belief that preventing life-prisoners from 
pursuing claims is a civilized response to any state interest.82  
While it may be true that “some legitimate purposes may be served 
by denying inmates access to the courts,” it is clear that such 
interests are not strong enough to save the civil death statute.83 
Even if Rhode Island courts find that preventing frivolous 
claims is an overpowering public necessity, they must also find that 
the civil death statute is narrowly tailored to that interest if the 
statute is to survive an AC Clause challenge.84  Rhode Island’s civil 
 
 76. Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1143 (R.I. 2018); see 
Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 2001). 
 77. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527; Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307–08. 
 78. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1976); 
Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258 (D. Or. 1973); Mitchell v. 
Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. Hopkins, 340 
A.2d 154 (Del. 1975); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973); Davis v. 
Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1971); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bilello v. A. J. Eckert Co., 346 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1973). 
 79. Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307–08. 
 80. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 528. 
 81. See Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307. 
 82. See SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 40. 
 83. See Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307. 
 84. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 528. 
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death statute “restricts and impedes the filing of many more types 
of inmate petitions than” merely frivolous or malicious claims.85  As 
such, it cannot be said that there are “‘no alternative method of 
correcting’” a frivolous prisoner-litigation problem.86  For example, 
a statute would more narrowly address the issue if it prescribed a 
process by which prisoners’ claims are determined to be either 
meritorious or frivolous before they may be litigated.87  Another 
alternative might be to enumerate certain predetermined causes of 
action as per se meritorious, or prohibited, for the purposes of 
initiating litigation like any other person.  It is clear that if 
preventing frivolous litigation is deemed to be an overpowering 
public interest, a law addressing that interest must be much more 
narrowly tailored than the civil death statute to withstand 
constitutional challenges. 
2. Invalidating the Civil Death Statute Is Supported by 
Compelling Policy Arguments 
Similar to the irony observed in Davis, a life-prisoner in Rhode 
Island exists in a fictitious, yet legally recognized, state of being 
wherein the government considers his natural death to have taken 
place despite the fact that he “nevertheless remains a [living] 
person and a citizen.”88  Rhode Island’s civil death statute likewise 
unapologetically converts life-prisoners into “human waste” by 
terminating not just their right to access courts, but “all civil rights 
and relations of any nature whatsoever.”89 
Additionally, the Davis court’s concern for “preposterous 
arguments and conclusions,” which inevitably arise from a literal 
interpretation of a civil death statute, is of equal concern to Rhode 
Island.90  Like the hypothetical civilly dead person who could refuse 
to pay his taxes because only living people pay taxes, or the 
hypothetical murderer who could never be charged for killing a 
civilly dead person, preposterous conclusions such as these can only 
be avoided in Rhode Island by an inconsistent and arbitrary 
application of the civil death statute.91  Nevertheless, the court in 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 527. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1971).  
 89. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956); see Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308.  
 90. See Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308. 
 91. See id. 
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Gallop refused to recognize any such selective application when it 
declined to read an exception into the civil death statute, stating 
that the statute “is clear and unambiguous on its face and should 
be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning . . . .”92  
In declining to do so, however, the court created one such 
preposterous conclusion when it stated that a civilly dead person is 
prohibited from asserting claims in court because he is  considered 
dead, but remains entitled to a ruling on a motion to amend the 
very claim which his imaginary death precludes him from 
bringing.93  As such, Gallop’s puzzling holding offers uncertain 
operational utility, undermines the authority of the AC Clause, and 
further highlights the need to repeal the civil death statute. 
In sum, Rhode Island’s civil death statute must be invalidated 
as an impermissible bar on life-prisoners’ right to access courts in 
violation of the plain language of the AC Clause, which is neither 
supported by an overwhelming public necessity nor strictly tailored 
to such an interest.  Indeed, “[i]f the constitutional guarantee of 
right of access to the courts is to have any meaning, this statute 
must be struck down.”94  Courts in Rhode Island must conclude that 
the civil death statute is neither in accord with “the spirit of our 
system of government” in Rhode Island, nor in “harmony with the 
spirit of our fundamental law,” because its affect is to regard life-
prisoners as human waste and to create unsustainable works of 
legal fiction.95 
For these same reasons, the Rhode Island Legislature would be 
equally remiss if it failed to repeal the civil death statute, and 
thereby put an end to “medieval jurisprudence” in Rhode Island.96  
Rhode Island must strive, like Oklahoma did in 1971, to realize the 
“existence, safety and personal liberties” of convicted felons––and 
of all people––as “natural rights which are fully and perpetually 
protected.”97 
III. RHODE ISLAND’S CIVIL DEATH STATUTE REMAINS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACCESS-TO-COURTS BARRIER UNDER LEWIS V. 
 
 92. Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1141 (R.I. 2018). 
 93. Id. at 1144–45. 
 94. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 199 (R.I. 1985). 
 95. See Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308. 
 96. See id.; Eisenman, supra note 5, at 170. 
 97. See Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308. 
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CASEY IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Another basis by which some states have invalidated civil 
death statues is on the grounds that they impermissibly bar life-
prisoners’ ability to access courts in violation of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.98  The United States Supreme Court 
has, since at least 1940, recognized an evolving view of prisoners’ 
right to access courts.99  This Part will explain why the civil death 
statute should be invalidated as an unconstitutional burden on 
prisoners’ right to access courts in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even under the restrictive holding of Lewis v. 
Casey.100 
A. Access-to-Courts Challenges Under Boddie v. Connecticut 
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional a state statute that prevented individuals 
who were unable to pay a filing fee from accessing courts to obtain 
a divorce.101  The Court emphasized that American courts are 
entrusted with protecting “individual rights and duties,” by 
implementing a “regularized, orderly process of dispute 
settlement.”102  The Court explained that a state’s “obligations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; 
rather the State owes to each individual that process which, in light 
of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due.”103  In 
doing so, the Court made clear that to no degree “less than [cases 
involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly], the right to a 
 
 98. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 878 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see also 
Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 258 (D. Or. 1973); Bush 
v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1215 (Alaska 1973). 
 99. David Steinberger, Lewis v. Casey: Tightening the Boundaries of 
Prisoner Access to the Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 377, 389 (1998). 
 100. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 343 (1996). 
 101. 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971). 
 102. See id. at 375. 
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more 
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules . . . 
enabling them to . . . definitively settle their differences in an orderly, 
predictable manner . . . . [I]t is this injection of the rule of law that 
allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists 
call the “state of nature.” 
Id. at 374. 
 103. Id. at 380. 
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meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of 
practicability, must be protected” from laws which seek to suppress 
that right.104  The Court in Boddie thus reasoned that “where a 
state commands a monopoly over the only available legitimate 
means of dispute settlement and the relationship underlying the 
dispute is warp and woof of the fabric of society, [a] state may not 
deny” completely prisoners’ right to access courts.105 
In Bush v. Reid, the Alaska Supreme Court applied the Boddie 
holding to the question of parolees’ right to access courts, and 
regarded the holding as the “starting point” for challenging a bar to 
this right.106  The court first determined that access to courts is the 
only recourse available to an injured American citizen whose 
injurer will not voluntarily remedy his condition.107  Second, the 
court unequivocally declared that “the denial of access to the civil 
courts rends the fabric of justice as surely . . . as [the ability to 
access family courts to obtain a divorce] in Boddie,” because “the 
very quality of [one’s] future existence may be dependent upon the 
outcome.”108  Because there are no significant alternative means of 
obtaining relief when a statute places a complete bar on access to 
courts, the threshold inquiry of the Boddie analysis was satisfied in 
Bush.109 
The Alaska Supreme Court also reasoned that another 
fundamental interest exists by which to invoke the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.110  The court explained that Bush’s 
personal injury claim was a form of property, known as a “chose in 
action.”111  The court thus reasoned that “deprivation of access to 
the courts . . . deprives [a] claimant of the whole value of his 
 
 104. Id. at 379. 
 105. Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Alaska 1973); see generally Boddie, 
401 U.S. at 371. 
 106. Bush, 516 P.2d at 1218. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1218–19. 
In Boddie Justice Harlan sought the fundamental human relationship 
doctrine to satisfy the due process clause only because denial of access 
to a divorce court does not impair a simpler ‘liberty or property’ 
interest . . . . [which would] justify] access to the particular dispute 
resolution process [and thereby] actuate [Fourteenth Amendment 
protection]. 
Id. 
 111. Id. at 1219.  
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property . . . [and] is no less severe than the taking of disputed 
wages or property during the pendency of litigation.”112 
The court concluded that such a deprivation of the right to 
access courts “condemn[s] [the deprived] to suffer a grievous loss of 
. . . rights protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess clause of the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment of the United States Constitution.”113  In balancing 
the competing interests for such a deprivation, the court identified 
as potential state interests the “fears of disruption of prison routine, 
spurious litigation . . . and increased risk of escape.”114  The court 
concluded, however, that with respect to parolees, these arguments 
satisfied neither strict scrutiny, nor rational review.115  The court 
likewise found, for the same reasons, that the statute also violated 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Alaska 
Constitutions.116  Crucially, the court added that civil death 
“violates the spirit and intention of the Alaska Constitution” and 
that the Court would thus “not be impeded in [its] constitutional 
progress by a narrower holding of the United States Supreme 
Court.”117 
Other courts have reached similar holdings in the context of 
life-prisoners who have not been released on parole.118  In 
Thompson v. Bond, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri conducted a strict scrutiny analysis of 
Missouri’s civil death statute.119  There, the court held that 
preventing frivolous litigation and preserving prison routine were 
insufficient interests to justify “the statute’s substantial 
infringement upon [life-prisoners’] fundamental rights.”120  The 
court found “no data or . . . evidence to show that prisoners are 
 
 112. Id.  “The judicial process exists to reduce inchoate claims to money 
judgment where private settlement is unavailing (or to extinguish them as 
non-meritorious).”  Id.  “Unlitigated claims for personal injury have slight 
market value.”  Id.  
 113. Id.  “We further declare that we would reach an identical result in 
interpreting the due process provisions of the Alaska Constitution alone, 
finding as we do that Justice Harlan’s insightful analysis of the social compact 
applies with equal force to our constitution.”  Id.  
 114. Id. at 1220. 
 115. Id. at 1220–21. 
 116. Id. at 1220. 
 117. Id. at 1219–20. 
 118. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Delorme v. 
Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Or. 1973); see also Bilello v. 
A. J. Eckert Co., 346 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
 119. See Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 878. 
 120. Id. at 884. 
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inherently inclined to file spurious lawsuits.”121  Crucially, the 
court determined that even if prisoners were so inclined, 
“foreclosing the filing of all prisoner suits, regardless of their merit, 
would be overbroad.”122  As such, Missouri’s civil death statute was 
thus invalidated as a violation of life-prisoners’ “right to due process 
of law” insofar as it terminated their capacity to access courts. 
After Boddie, the general right of access to courts in the context 
of prisoners was initially reinforced by the United States Supreme 
Court in Bounds v. Smith.123  In Bounds, the Court was concerned 
with “whether [s]tates must protect the right of prisoners to 
access . . . courts by providing them with law libraries or 
alternative sources of legal knowledge.”124  Importantly, the Court 
expressly “established beyond doubt that prisoners have a 
constitutional right of access to the courts.”125  Bounds has been 
called “the benchmark” access-to-courts case because it held that 
all people, including prisoners, have a “fundamental constitutional 
right of access to the courts.”126  This right “requires prison 
authorities to assist inmates in preparation and filing of 
meaningful legal papers,” and thus necessarily implies that states 
may not completely bar life-prisoners from accessing courts.127 
B. Access-to-Courts Challenges After Lewis v. Casey 
The United States Supreme Court changed its approach to 
prisoner access-to-courts challenges in Lewis v. Casey, where it 
revisited the implications of its holding in Bounds.128  In Lewis, the 
Court held first that “in order to establish a violation of Bounds, an 
inmate must show that the alleged inadequacies . . . caused him 
‘actual injury . . . .’”129  Secondly, and crucially, “[t]he Court 
emphasized that the right of access [to courts] for prisoners, like all 
prisoners’ rights, is evaluated under rational basis review . . . .”130  
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 124. Id. at 817. 
 125. Id. at 821. 
 126. Id. at 828; Steinberger, supra note, 99 at 378. 
 127. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.  
 128. See 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828).  
 129. Id. at 348.  
 130. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 10.9 (4th ed. 2011).  “[A] prison regulation impinging on inmates’ 
constitutional rights ‘is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
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Additionally, the Court was careful to point out that “several 
statements in Bounds went beyond the right of access [to courts] 
recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied . . . .”131  
Specifically, statements in Bounds, which “appear to suggest that 
[a] [s]tate must enable [a] prisoner to discover grievances, and to 
litigate effectively once in court” must now be disclaimed.132  The 
Court explained that the Constitution does not require “the 
conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly 
uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison population . . . .”133  
Despite significantly walking-back its previous holdings, the Lewis 
Court nevertheless conceded that “[t]he right that Bounds 
acknowledged was the (already well-established) right of access to 
the courts.”134 
C. Challenging Rhode Island’s Civil Death Statute Under Lewis 
It has been said that Lewis represented a “drastic attempt to 
limit the . . . constitutional right of inmates to meaningful[ly]” 
access courts.135  While this may be true, civilly dead life-prisoners 
in Rhode Island have more significant access-to-courts barriers 
than the availability of a law library or legal assistance.  Rhode 
Island’s civil death statute precludes would-be life-prisoner 
claimants, like Gallop, from accessing “the only available legitimate 
means of dispute settlement,” by prohibiting their access to civil 
courts.136  Further, the complete denial of Gallop’s and other life-
prisoners’ access to “civil courts rends the fabric of justice as surely” 
in Rhode Island as it did in Connecticut or Alaska.137  Likewise, to 
the extent that Rhode Island recognizes claimants as possessing a 
“chose in action” property right, the civil death statute deprives life-
prisoners of the entire value of that right.138  As such, the civilly 
dead in Rhode Island meet the criteria for initiating a Due Process 
 
interests.’”  Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987)). 
 131. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. 
 132. Id.  (emphasis in original). 
 133. Id.  The Lewis opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, indeed 
made no attempt to conceal its operating prejudice against prisoners.  See id. 
 134. Id. at 350 (emphasis in original). 
 135. Steinberger, supra note 99, at 378. 
 136. See Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Alaska 1973). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 1219. 
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and Equal Protection challenge under the Boddie framework.139 
Under Lewis, however, a life-prisoner in Rhode Island 
asserting that the statute unconstitutionally bars his right to access 
courts must show an actual injury, “such as the inability to meet a 
filing deadline or to present a claim.”140  Unlike the hypothetical 
life-prisoner anticipated in Lewis, who is not injured by a state’s 
failure to “confe[r] . . . sophisticated legal capabilities” with which 
to litigate his claims, life-prisoners in Rhode Island suffer actual 
injury when their claims are dismissed by mandate of the civil 
death statute.141  Gallop’s actual injury, which was a complete bar 
on his capacity to access courts, is incomparable to the injury of a 
prisoner who merely does not have access to an adequate law 
library to research the claims that he has the capacity to bring.142  
As such, life-prisoners in Rhode Island meet the Lewis “actual 
injury” requirement. 
Although Bush involved parolees, the Court’s rationale is 
directly applicable to Rhode Island’s civil death statute, which 
makes no exception for life-prisoners who are later paroled.143  Just 
as in Alaska, there is an “utter vacancy of rationale” for preventing 
a paroled life-prisoner in Rhode Island from accessing courts, even 
under the “more lenient ‘rational basis’ test” prescribed by Lewis.144 
The same vacancy of rationale exists for preventing life-
prisoners who are not released on parole from accessing courts.  
There is no data or evidence to support the argument that life-
prisoners are “inherently inclined” to pursue frivolous litigation.145  
Rhode Island’s civil death statute, of course, prevents all life-
prisoners from asserting all claims.146  Even if preventing frivolous 
litigation is a legitimate state interest under Lewis, the civil death 
statute still cannot survive rational basis review because it makes 
 
 139. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971); see also Bush, 515 
P.2d at 1218.  
 140. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996). 
 141. See id. at 354. 
 142. See Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1141 (R.I. 2018). 
 143. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956).  “In the case of a prisoner sentenced 
to imprisonment for life, a parole permit may be issued at any time after the 
prisoner has served not less than ten (10) years imprisonment,” provided that 
other criteria, accounting for the severity of the crime, are met.  Id. § 13-8-
13(a). 
 144. Bush, 516 P.2d at 1220, 1221; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361. 
 145. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 884 (W.D. Mo. 1976). 
 146. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1. 
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no attempt to distinguish meritorious from frivolous claims.147  
Such a draconian, blanket prohibition of the right to access courts 
cannot reasonably be considered rationally related to the interest 
in preventing frivolous litigation in a just, civilized state.  There are 
“[m]uch less onerous ways . . . available to protect the judicial 
process” and routine prison activity from frivolous litigation than a 
complete bar on “an entire class of litigants” like life-prisoners.148  
One can see that the only true rationale for preventing life-
prisoners from bringing good-faith, meritorious claims is the 
farcical and punitively conservative view of life-prisoners as non-
living “human waste,” who are not entitled to their rights as 
citizens.149  In short, the civil death statute remains an 
impermissible access-to-courts barrier, despite the narrowing of the 
Supreme Court’s access-to-courts doctrine in Lewis, and must be 
invalidated as a violation of Rhode Island life-prisoners’ right to 
access to courts under Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
 
 147. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361. 
 148. Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Or. 1973) 
(holding that state-defendants failed to show that a civil death’s bar on access 
to courts was rationally related to the interest in preventing frivolous 
litigation). 
 
In most instances . . . prisoners need not be brought to the courtroom 
to resolve a civil matter.  Where the prisoner’s testimony is important, 
the court can direct him to submit an affidavit or suggest a deposition 
at the prison.  Various courts have ruled that a prisoner has no 
constitutional right to be present at a civil trial . . . and therefore a 
civil suit need not necessarily disrupt the prison routine by requiring 
transportation to and from the court.   
Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 884–85. 
 149. Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1971). 
Although there is no Rhode Island legislative history available that 
would shed light on the purpose of Section 13–6–1, the Supreme Court 
of Rhode Island has indicated that the provision “was intended to be 
a limitation on the assertion of any rights by a prisoner serving a life 
sentence.”  
Ferreira v. Wall, C.A. No. 15-219-ML, 2016 WL 8235110, at *2 (D. R.I. Oct. 26, 
2016) (quoting Bogosian v. Vaccaro, 422 A.2d 1253, 1254 (R.I. 1980)).  Such a 
vague and undefined state interest, which amounts to no more than a 
threadbare paraphrasing of the civil death statute’s text, is repugnant to the 
very spirit and intention of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions, 
and thus is not a legitimate state interest which would save the civil death 
statute.  A statute that terminates all of a person’s “rights of property . . . the 
bond of matrimony and . . . all civil rights and relations of any nature 
whatsoever,” simply is not rationally related to criminal punishment.  See § 13-
6-1. 
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Constitution.150 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Legislature must recognize the improvident 
nature of the civil death statute and repeal it.  Alternatively, Rhode 
Island courts must invalidate the statute as an impermissible bar 
on life-prisoners’ right to access courts in violation of the AC Clause 
of the Rhode Island Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  Rhode Island must join its peers 
in the realization that “the concept of civil death has been 
condemned by virtually every court and commentator to study it 
[since the 1940s].”151  The uncomfortable truth that Alaska, 
Florida, Missouri, and Oklahoma in the 1970s and 1980s 
represented a more progressive iteration of criminal justice, which 
afforded more rights to its prisoners than does Rhode Island in 
2019, cannot be overstated, and is an authoritarian stain on the 
conscience of a state which is at times a leading example of social 
values.152  So long as Rhode Island continues to give legitimacy to 
the “vestige of medieval jurisprudence” that is its civil death 
 
 150. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. 
 151. See Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 885.  
Finally, the Court cannot fail to note that the concept of civil death 
has been condemned by virtually every court and commentator to 
study it over the last thirty years.  Only approximately 13 states have 
yet to abolish their civil death statutes, and neither the practice 
elsewhere nor any evidence mustered by defendants for this Court’s 
attention indicates that abolition of civil death has adversely affected 
prison routine or overburdened correctional administrators or state 
courts in other jurisdictions. 
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statute, it cannot achieve its fundamental ideal that “[e]very person 
ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase, 
completely and without denial.” 
 
